Tuesday, December 10, 2013

A partial list of non-economics works that informed the design of our course




Thursday, December 5, 2013

Shapiro-Stiglitz Model

First - about the final

Different Format
Potential Questions.

Next about the discussion group.

Some background for why and a prominent topic we might want to discuss - reverse time management

Background - Do good students take on too many obligations?
From an economics perspective - there is focus on the extensive margin, more lines on the resume.  What about the intensive margin?
First Class Site with Blogging - 4 years ago
http://tiffanywc.blogspot.com/2009/11/do-i-change-my-ways.html#comment-form
Encouraging the Mind to Putter

Another issue related to the first - Do students have sufficient agency about their own learning.  In other words, if something interests the student does the student have the wherewithal to pursue the interest.  If not, why not?

Then, on the relevance of the our class to understand real world current events.  

Ed Lazear on Why There Is Mandatory Retirement  (There isn't any more.)
Relationship of wage profile to reservation wage profile (Implicit bonding?)
Defined benefit pensions
What about the employer moral hazard?

Efficiency says separation should occur when the marginal product equals the reservation wage.  But if the paid wage exceeds the reservation wage, the employer has incentive to separate when the marginal product equals the the paid wage.  If the employer did induce separation then, it would be cashing in.  Seeing that behavior would demoralize other employees.

This is one way to interpret what is going on with State of Illinois pensions now ---- but note that the real cashing in happened many years earlier when the state failed to actually make its share of the contribution to the fund and instead spent those funds on other things.

Discussion about monitoring as applied to our class and elsewhere. 

They're watching you at work
The article says that at Bloomberg every keystroke an employee makes is monitored.

In our class -
Box - sends me an email every time there is a download (but unless you are logged in it doesn't say who).  It also has features like the YouTube Dashboard.
YouTube Dashboard
Google Form (for Excel Homework) gives time stamp.   (What information is conveyed.

More active monitoring
In class by noting -

  • Who is there
  • Who participates in discussion
  • Facial expressions of students (this one is very important)
  • Who seems to be nodding off

This is monitoring that carries no explicit punishment or reward.  But it does communicate on commitment, comprehension, and overall whether the class is going well or not.  This monitoring is all part of what teaching a small class is about so it happens en passant while teaching.

Reading blog posts  - my comments/questions are intended as a type of coaching.  Doing this is labor intensive and clearly not required of instructors.  I do get a sense of how you are doing with this, so there is definitely a monitoring aspect.   If the coaching is at all effective, then it should improve your learning.

So a question is what is the output - a taught class?  or how much students learn in that class?

I don't monitor potential plagiarism with the blogging.  Why not?

Shapiro-Stiglitz model

In typical supply demand model - no rents for actors on the margin.   A surplus can be earned by actors on the infra-margin.

Question:  If rents are required for incentive and no actor has market power, how can the market equilibrium be consistent with addressing the moral hazard ?

Answer:  There must be rationing - In this model rationing means involuntary unemployment.

So this model has Keynesian features, but it generates that for non-Keynesian reasons.  (Keynes talks about failure in aggregate demand.  The Shapiro -tiglitz model talks about moral hazard in labor supply.)

Work through algebra of asset equations

Review homework on endogenizing the monitoring intensity and whey the equilibrium is not Surplus Maximizing.

Candidate Questions for the Final

I have decided NOT to distribute last year's exam.  When I did that for the midterms, it produced what I perceived to be memorization of the solution I offered up.  I'd much prefer you to generate your own solution and give it in your own words.  So I'm trying a different approach in an attempt to deter some of the memorization.

Of course, you can post questions (as comments to this post) and I will respond to them.  But I will do so without providing a full answer to the question that you can memorize in toto.

Also, you can schedule a meeting with me if you'd like.  I'm happy to discuss this or any other course issue with you.

There are six candidate questions below and three will be chosen from the six.  Two are new to you.
You haven't seen them before and are on the last portion of the course.  The other four you have seen either the question as posed or something similar.  These are questions on the content of Midterm 1 and Midterm 2 that didn't appear on those exams.

-----

The New Questions:

A.  This question concerns shirking and explicit incentives to prevent it, as well as the consequences on market equilibrium.  Compare and contrast the static principal-agent model with random output to the Shapiro-Stiglitz model.  Discuss the underlying assumptions, how incentives for putting forth effort are provided, and the consequence on equilibrium, from both the contractual perspective and the market perspective.  Also discuss for each model whether or not there is a role for government to play to improve market performance.

B.  This question concerns innovative practice in the the setting of the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma.  Employees with some responsibility allocated to them may be quite diligent in doing their established work, so shirking per se is not an issue at all, but they may be very reluctant to try out new approaches for fear of being blamed when an experiment along those lines blows up in their faces.  There are various possible solutions to this issue:
     (i) provide large rewards for experiments that succeed,
     (ii) pool experiments across several employees each with some responsibility so responsibility is shared,
    (iii) punish work groups if they don't show innovation over time.
     (iv) possibly other mechanisms that might occur to you.

Discuss the pros and cons of each of these and discuss how the organization might come to a particular approach in trying to encourage organization members to be innovative.

------
Candidate Questions from Midterm 1

C.  This question concerns transfer prices.  Provide a working definition for what a transfer price is.  In a for-profit organization how should ownership (shareholders) want the transfer price to be set?  Explain why others in the organization might want the transfer price to be set differently.  What transfer price would these others like to see?  When service quality is jointly set with the transfer price, what service quality would ownership like to see?  Explain why this is the case.  Others may want a different service quality level.  Explain how their preferred service quality level differs from what ownership wants.

D.  This question concerns economic efficiency concepts.  There is a partial equilibrium concept and a general equilibrium concept.  Describe each of these.  Do the two concepts always coincide?  If not, under what additional assumptions do they coincide.  Provide an argument for why we should expect efficient outcomes.  Economic efficiency has been critiqued on several grounds. Explain some of these criticisms and provide settings where the particular critique appears valid.

---------

Candidate Questions from Midterm 2

E. This question concerns procurement. Discus why in government agencies procurement is subject to  regulation. What is the regulation aimed at preventing? What does it try to accomplish? Explain why during the bidding process the lowest price bidder may not be selected, although the process is competitive. Discuss the various goals the agency conducting the procurement may have going into the process.

F. This question concerns conflict in organizations and, in particular, Model 1 and Model 2 of Schon and Argyris. Explain how a manager can without intending to do so cause the staff under him to be angry with his management approach. What is it that causes their anger? What are the consequences for the unit when the manager behaves this way? Explain the Schon and Argyris recommendation about how the manager might diffuse the tension. Why does their recommendation have a chance to be effective?

About the Final Exam

The final will be a different format than the midterms.  It will be an all essay test.  There will be no math-like problems as on the midterms.  The essay questions may cover topics we have math modeled, but they will ask for a discussion of the issues, not derivation of a bunch of equations.

As has been the practice, I will make the candidate questions known ahead of time.  There will be six candidate questions.  Three will be chosen.  You can count on one of those being on content covering the reputations and dynamic incentives, since you haven't been tested on that yet.  The other questions can come from material done earlier in the semester.

The Final is worth 300 points, yet I'm only having three essay questions, not six of them.  This is so I can grade the thing in a reasonable time frame.  So each essay will be worth 100 points.  This doesn't mean you have to write twice as much as you wrote on the midterms.  It does mean I will be a little sterner grading the essays on the final.

Wednesday, December 4, 2013

Something for next semester - a discussion group*

*For your edification and not for credit

If there is interest I would like to start a weekly discussion group in the spring on the general theme of taking the long view on your learning - things members of the group might try to have a greater take away from both the academic side and the intellectual part of the recreational side of undergraduate life.   It would also be a place for group members to drive the discussion, talk about issues they are having and have the group weigh in on how to think it through.  In some sense it is meant as a face to face alternative to the blogging you have done this semester.  

The past couple of years I have mentored an I-Promise student.  I don't have an I-Promise mentee this year, so for me the group would be an alternative.  We know each other a bit now from our class so we shouldn't need to spend much time breaking the ice.  The group would also be a bit of an experiment on whether outside of a course setting coaching qua thinking "it" through (whatever it is) can be effective for participants.  I've not done a discussion group with students like this before.  

In my ideal we'd block off 90 minutes once a week.  We might not go that long each week, but sometimes we would.  Size-wise I'd hope for 4 or 5 students. That's about the max where if everyone shows each can participate vigorously in the conversation.  Less would be okay but make the group more vulnerable to no shows.  If more are interested I'd want to accommodate that, but it would move the group closer to a classroom setting and then the participation issue would creep in.  

Since this is unofficial, scheduling could be a bear.  That's the main reason for posting about this now.  If you are interested, please indicate so via a comment to this post.  Also say whether your schedule for next semester is pretty firm or still up in the air.  It's no use to set a time until those who are interested have a good idea about their schedules.  

Tuesday, December 3, 2013

Reputations: Personal and Organizational

Before getting into the topic of the day -

Excel Homework on Shapiro-Stiglitz Efficiency Wage Model is due Wednesday evening.
One caveat on shirking - don't take it too literally.  It makes the most sense for physical labor where the work is painful or for repetitive work that is "mind numbing".  It makes less sense as a defining characteristic of "knowledge work." Professionals typically don't shirk.  The moral hazard issue there is not that professionals do no work at all, but rather that they want to define the work that they do, while their manager has other ideas.  The "alignment problem" is where moral hazard in knowledge work is likely to manifest.  Shirking per se is not the big deal issue.  We have modeled it as if it is.

The last blog post is due Friday.   In addition to the prompt, I think it useful to consider that post from something we discussed the first week of the semester - it is your human capital.  Has the course given you some new ideas about how to extend your human capital and better maintain the human capital you already have.  In particular on the blogging, do you think you are now capable of writing your own prompt and in offering comments/critique the way I've done during the semester.  Could you apply that to other courses you will take in the future and/or to paid work you will do after you graduate?

Personal Reputations - An Example: Professor Arvan when he was a student

Found with artifacts from cleaning out my parents' condo.
The Generation Gap

An alternative view from several years earlier.
Page from High School Yearbook about It's Academic

email response from Mr. Conrad.

From: Steve Conrad [mailto:srconrad@aol.com]
Sent: Monday, January 05, 2009 12:43 PM
To: Arvan, Lanny
Subject: Hi from Manhasset
Sent: Monday, January 05, 2009 12:43 PM
Hi Lanny, 
Of curse (that WAS a typo, but I think I shall leave it there) I remember that game of TWIXT. My nature is to play games to win, so your win was not with my assistance. You just plain old beat me. You actually caught my business Web site (Math Leagues and Math League Press) just as we are preparing to sell it. We began offering math contests to schools around the country in 1975. Were it not for that, I do not know how I would have sent my sons to the schools they attended (Harvard and Princeton). They are identical twins, as you must recall, and they are both mathematicians, it so happens. Brian, a math professor at Stanford, and Keith, who teaches math at the University of Connecticut, were surrounded by math as they were growing up, so . . . :) 
You must remember James Kraft, right? One of my sons was giving a math talk to a group of mathematicians once and James Kraft walked up to him after the talk and said "I was in your father's algebra class when he was called to leave because you were born."
Brings tears of joy to my eyes. I too recall that very well. 
I had lunch with Robin Block over 4 years ago. After retirement, I returned to playing bridge. I had dropped out of college and was going to be a professional card player when I decided to return and lead a normal life. Anyway, after retirement, I returned to bridge, and my wife and I had lunch with Robin when I was playing in the North American Bridge Ch ampionships when they were held in New York City in the summer of 2004. These days, I am tournament chairman for Long Island, and I spend almost half a year each year teaching bridge on cruise ships (I teach only when the ship is at sea -- when it is in port, I go ashore with the passengers). 
So I see you are in academia. What was your academic field? College administration? :) 
Steve



Conclusion:  Since personal reputations are held by others about that person, that reputation might very well vary by the holder, who brings his or her own memories into it.


Organizational Reputations - An Example: The U of I

Professor Arvan's first encounter with the U of I when he was in High School

New Yorker's view about everything west of the Hudson.

1.  What movie is this from and what does it represent?


From Wikipedia
HAL became operational on 12 January 1997 at the HAL Laboratories in Urbana, Illinois

2.  From a Saturday course on Fortran.
Illiac

3.  A few years later when at Cornell - a friend of a housemate was going to the U of I for grad school to study?    

......... computer science.

Conclusion:  The U of I has a reputation for being good with computers.  This was the reputation Professor Arvan had of the place before he came to the midwest.

Some years later after arriving on campus

Morrow Plots
Undergrad Library built underground
Department of Ag Econ
Morrill Acts

Conclusion:  The U of I has a reputation for being the Land Grant College for the State of Illinois.

Other views of the U of I

What is the movie?



Scene from later in the movie:



Now a view from the world of sports.





Question:  Which if any of the above are part of the U of I's brand?


More generally - What part of the organization is responsible for the organization's brand?  the organization's reputation?

Does it matter for our course that the Web site is not in the illinois.edu domain and lacks I-mark?

Branding for cereal aimed at kids.






What about cashing in on the reputation?

Example - student backpacks.   (Good brands?  Brands to avoid?)

Different example - student laptops?  (Same questions.)

The economics of reputation and cashing in

Experience goods versus inspection goods.  (Nelson)  There is no seller moral hazard with inspection goods.  There is with experience goods.  What encourages seller to produce good quality?

Klein and Leffler - Quality Assuring Price

The economics of reputation from an Industrial Organization perspective

Branding can:
1.  Encourage customers to be loyal.
2.  "Steal" customers from a rival.
3.  Bring new customers into the market.

Competition between firms in an industry is muted  if most of the customers are loyal and there are not a lot of new customers to compete over.  Conversely competition between firms is fierce if there is a lot of business stealing and there are many new customers entering the market.

There can be a tension between having too much competition in an industry and maintaining a quality assuring price.

Student Blog Posts on Organizational Reputation

For the most part the posts focused on a few sectors of industry.

1.  Sporting Goods (Nike, Addidas)
2.  Financial Services - Big Banks (Chase), Local Banks, Credit Card Companies (Discover),  Investment Services (Merrill Lynch).
3.  Technology Companies - Facebook, Google, Apple  - from perspective as consumer, also as potential employer
4.  Misc - Amazon as virtual Walmart, A Conglomerate for Auto Parts.

Let's first ask whether the reputation that was described is shared by other holders of the reputation.  Or do they see things differently?  How do you know?

Next consider these from the IO perspective, then the moral hazard perspective.

Then let's ask whether merger or takeover of a company impacts its brand and its reputations.